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EVIDENCE-FOR THE SAKE OF THE
MARRIAGE: FIRST CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF
THE JOINT PARTICIPANTS EXCEPTION
COMPLICATES CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
MARRIED CO-CONSPIRATORS-UNITED STATES
V. PINEDA-MATEO, 905 F.3D 13 (1ST CIR. 2018).
The federal government is prohibited from compelling a married
1
person to testify against their spouse in a criminal proceeding. This concept
is referred to as the spousal testimonial privilege (the "Privilege"), and it

grants a spouse the right to refuse to take the witness stand against their
defendant-spouse.2

3
Accordingly, the witness-spouse holds the Privilege.

There are two modem rationales sustaining the Privilege .4 The first rationale
is the interest of "fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marital
relationship."' The Privilege is intended to uphold the significance of

1 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) ("[T]he witness may be neither
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying" in a federal criminal case in which defendant
is witness's spouse); see also Amy G. Bermingham, Partners in Crime: The Joint Participants
Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019, 1019
(1985) (explaining Privilege from witness's point of view: "[t]he privilege against adverse spousal
testimony is the privilege of a witness in federal proceedings to refuse to testify against his or her
spouse."); Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privilegesfor CohabitingParents:ProtectingChildren Inside
and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 761 (2010) ("[T]he spousal testimonial privilege
allows spouses to refuse to testify against each other in criminal trials.").
2 See United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2014) (identifying two marital
privileges recognized by federal courts); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (developing Privilege in
order to satisfy modem rationales). In Trammel, the Supreme Court adapted the Privilege to allow
the witness-spouse to choose whether to testify adversely against the defendant-spouse. Trammel,
445 U.S. at 53.
3 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Protecting "Any Child": The Use of the Confidential-MaritalCommunications Privilege in Child-Molestation Cases, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2010)
("Generally, the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege prevents a witness-spouse from testifying
adversely at trial against the defendant-spouse unless the witness-spouse chooses to testify; thus,
the witness-spouse holds this privilege.").
4 See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (considering rationales behind
Privilege); see also United States v. Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]he privilege is
rooted in a dual desire to protect marital harmony and to avoid the unseemliness of compelling one
").
spouse to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding ....
5 See Trammel, 445 U.S at 44 (noting Privilege's rationales); see also Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77
(discussing prior changes to Privilege and explaining Court's current rationale).
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife
in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to
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marriage and reinforce the intimacy and privacy that makes the marital bond
unique. 6 The second rationale seeks to avoid the "natural repugnance" that
"every fair-minded person" would perceive if the government were
to

compel a wife or husband "to be the means of the other's condemnation"
through adverse testimony and, in so doing, subject the defendant-spouse "to
the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his [or her] intimate life
partner."7

Recently, a case came before the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit that presented the opportunity to recognize an exception to
the Privilege.' The joint participants exception ("Exception") allows the
prosecutor in a federal criminal proceeding (the "Government") to compel a
witness-spouse to testify against a defendant-spouse if that witness-spouse is
alleged to have participated in the alleged criminal act.9 On September 25,

2015, dfYovannys Guerrero-Tejada ("Guerrero") answered a phone call
from a confidential informant seeking to purchase heroin.10 During this
phone call, Guerrero was heard consulting with another individual, alleged
foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the
benefit of the public as well.
Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77; Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) ("The reason for the
rule at common law disqualifying the [witness-spouse] is to protect the sanctity and tranquility of
the marital relationship.").
6 See State ex rel. Barker v. McAuley, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 424,433 (Tenn. 1871) ("If [spouses
were] permitted [to testify against each other], it would tend to destroy that bond of mutual
confidence and unquestioning trust that is essential to the peace and happiness of this most sacred
of all domestic relations."); see also Yerardi, 192 F.3d at 18 (upholding Privilege and outlining its
purpose).
7 See In re Malfitano, 755 F.2d 1022, 1028 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted),
vacated as moot sub nom. United States v. Koecher, 475 U.S. 133 (1986); see also Yerardi, 192
F.3d at 18 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53) (discussing two rationales supporting Court's current
reasoning for upholding marital privileges); In re Malfitano Oct. 18, 1979 Witness, 633 F.2d 276,
277 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The main rationale for the privilege today is that it protects the marriage from
the discord that occurs when one spouse testifies against the other.") (citation omitted). e
8 See United States v. Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (presenting issue of
whether to recognize Exception to Privilege).
9 See id. at 16-18 (outlining brief history of Exception); see also Bermingham, supra note 1,
at 1021 ("In 1983 the Seventh Circuit held that the privilege cannot be claimed by a witness who
is alleged to have participated in the crime with which his or her spouse is charged and about which
the witness is summoned to testify."); Matt Clarke, First CircuitAnnounces No JointParticipation
Exception to Spousal Testimonial Privilege, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2019/feb/1 4/first-circuit-announces-no-jointparticipation-exception-spousal-testimonial-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/SZH3-2A3U] (reporting
on First Circuit's decision in Pineda-Mateoand providing history of Exception).
10 See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 18 (detailing facts that led to charges). "[Guerrero] told the
informant to raise $1,000 to pay part of a prior drug debt before arranging another drug transaction.
Three days later, the informant called Guerrero again and 'arranged to purchase three fingers of
heroin from Guerrero and Pineda."' Id.; see also United States v. Tejeda, No. 15-cr-215-01/02-JL,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124851, at *2-3 (D.N.I. Aug. 8, 2017) (recounting facts of case).
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to have been her husband, Eric Pineda-Mateo ("Pineda"). On October 6,
2015, Guerrero met the confidential informant in the parking lot of a mall in
Newington, New Hampshire and exchanged a bag of heroin for $1,000 in
cash.'2
The informant contacted Guerrero again on October 21, asking to
purchase more heroin. 3 Guerrero met with the informant and exchanged
twenty-five grams of heroin for $1,000.14 Although Pineda joined his wife
for this meeting, Guerrero was the one who physically performed the drug
transaction. 5 Guerrero and the informant had multiple conversations over
the next several weeks.' 6 They arranged a third transaction for November
16.17 When Guerrero and Pineda arrived for this third transaction, they were
arrested by the New Hampshire State Police. 8 The police searched the car,
which was registered to Pineda, and recovered twenty-five grams of

fentanyl.19

The government alleged that the evidence established a conspiracy
20
between Guerrero and Pineda based on the events that transpired. Guerrero
and Pineda were jointly indicted for conspiracy to possess heroin and
fentanyl with the intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute those

See Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d at 18 (recounting facts of case).

t'

12 See Tejeda, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124851, at *2 (recounting facts of case).

See id. (recounting facts of case).
See id. at *2-3 (describing amount purchased as five "fingers" of heroin).
15 See Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2018) (No.
17-1857) ("Guerrero handed the cooperator a bag of heroin underneath the table, and the cooperator
handed Guerrero $1,000.").
16 See Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d at 18 ("Two weeks later, the informant arranged a second drug
transaction with Guerrero and Pineda, after which the informant attempted to set up a third
transaction.").
17 See id. (recounting facts of case).
18 See United States v. Tejeda, No. 15-cr-215-01/02-JL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124851, at *3
(D.N.H. Aug. 8, 2017) (recounting facts of case).
19 See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 18. (recounting facts of case).
20 See id. (recounting evidence of conspiracy). The Government primarily based its conspiracy
13
14

charges on the following information:
[D]uring the recorded phone calls with the informant, Guerrero repeatedly referred to
'her husband' and negotiated the transactions in concert with him. Additionally, Pineda
also appeared to be the person who acquired the heroin subsequently sold to the
informant. Furthermore, agents observed both Guerrero and Pineda meeting with the
informant in person to conduct the second transaction, during which Guerrero and Pineda
spoke to each other in Spanish before speaking in English to the informant. Finally,
Guerrero and Pineda were arrested together at the location of the planned third drug
transaction.

2020]

FOR THE SAKE OF THE MARRIAGE

substances .2 1 Guerrero pled guilty to all counts, and Pineda elected to go to
trial on the single count against him. 22 Through a pretrial subpoena and
motion, the prosecution indicated its intent to call Guerrero as a witness at
Pineda's trial, which was scheduled to begin on May 8, 2017.23 Before trial
began, Guerrero invoked her adverse spousal testimonial privilege and
moved to quash the Government's subpoena. 24 In response, the Government
moved the court to compel Guerrero's testimony, seeking to invoke an
exception to the Privilege "for a jointly participating spouse in a criminal
conspiracy ."2
The district court granted Guerrero's motion to quash the
Government's subpoena and denied the Government's motion to compel
Guerrero's testimony. 26 In doing so, the district court acknowledged that
there is a circuit split among the federal courts- with one circuit adopting
and three rejecting the Exception -that the Government now moved the First
Circuit to recognize .27
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rule 501") governs
claims of privilege in federal courts .2 8 At its inception, Rule 501 was
designed to provide a list of privileges applicable in federal courts .29
However, Rule 501 was modified to allow for the evolution and development
of privileges, so that privileges could always reflect modem laws and societal
21

See id. at 18-19 (detailing charges); Tejeda, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124851, at *3

(recounting procedural history of case). They were indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21
U.S.C. § 846. Tejeda, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124851, at *3; see also 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-135) (d"A]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this title shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.").
22 See Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d at 19 (recounting facts of case).
23 See id. ("Intending to call her as a witness at trial, the Government subpoenaed Guerrero
and filed a motion in limine 'seeking a determination, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a),
that her testimony is admissible."'); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("The court must decide any
preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is
admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.").
24 See Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d at 19 (recounting procedural postures of parties).
25 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (introducing Exception in opinion).
26 See id. (recounting procedural postures of court and parties).
27 See id. at 19-20 (discussing district court's ruling and reasoning). Based on the weight of
authority, the district court was unable to seriously consider adopting the Exception. Id.
21 See FED.R. EvtD. 501 (establishing rule and governing claims of privilege in federal courts).
"The common law-as interpreted by United States courts in light of reason and experiencegoverns a claim of privilege" unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, a federal statute, or
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Id.
29 See NOTES OF COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1975) (including lawyerclient, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife privileges). When the evidentiary rule on privileges
was first submitted to Congress, it contained thirteen rules, nine of which specified privileges that
federal courts were to recognize. Id.; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,
403 (1998) (discussing source of attorney-client privilege in federal courts).
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interests.30 Rule 501 now provides the federal courts with a standard to apply
when determining whether a privilege exists, should exist, or, if one already
31 The standard is
exists, whether that privilege should be modified.
expressed as follows: "the common law-as interpreted by United States
courts in the light of reason and experience- governs a claim of
privilege ....-32 In sum, rather than listing specific rules of privilege to
30

See NOTES OF COMM. ON THE JuDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 93-650 (1975).
The Committee amended Article V to eliminate all of the Court's specific Rules on
privileges. Instead, the Committee, through a single Rule, 501, left the law of privileges
in its present state and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by
the courts of the United States under a uniform standard applicable both in civil and
criminal cases.

Id.; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) ("In rejecting the proposed Rules
and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of
privilege. Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to leave the door open to change.") (citations omitted);
Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 279, 283-84
(2008) (discussing modem rates of marriage among young people); Imran Rasul, MarriageMarkets
and Divorce Laws, 22 U. CHI. J. L., EcON. & ORG. 1, 1 (2005) (discussing changing marital
dynamics). Because Rule 501 offers the ability to adapt and develop privileges to conform to
modem societal interests, it is worthwhile to note that "[t]he nature of family life in America has
changed dramatically over the past fifty years. Fewer persons are marrying than ever before, those
who marry do so later in life, and more marriages are now broken by divorce than death." Rasul,
supra note 30, at 1. These statistics do not indicate that the ideals of marriage are less valued than
they once were-as a variety of factors contribute to them-but they could tilt the scales when it
comes to balancing society's interests in these ideals versus prosecuting conspirators. See Rasul,
supra note 30, at 1.
31 See NOTES OF COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 93-650 (1975) (noting uniform
standard prescribed by Rule 501); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)
(refusing to recognize privilege protecting from disclosure peer-review materials contained in
tenure files). The Supreme Court recognized that Rule 501 "manifests a Congressional desire 'not
to freeze the law of privilege' and that the Rule is intended to provide flexibility, so that rules of
privilege can be developed on a case-by-case basis. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (citations
omitted). However, the Court also expressed its disinclination to do so. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at
189; Freiermuth v. PPG Indus., 218 F.R.D. 694,697 (N.D. Ala. 2003) ("Although Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 allows development of rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, the court treads
cautiously when being asked to recognize a new privilege."); Winton v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 188
FR]). 398,399 (N.D. Okla. 1999) (discussing standard).
Rule 501 creates no substantive privileges by its own force. Rule 501 simply informs
federal courts of how they are to determine whether a particular privilege exists. Federal
courts must look to sources external to Rule 501 (i.e., state law or common law) to
determine if a particular privilege ... exists in a certain context.
Winton, 188 F.R.D. at 399; Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The
legislative history of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes it clear that Congress
intended that the courts should continue to develop the federal common law of privilege on caseby-case basis.").
32 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (listing language of law). The Rule offers exceptions to the broad
discretion that it granted the federal courts by limiting that discretion if there are applicable rules
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which the federal courts must adhere, Rule 501 empowers the federal courts
to "[develop] rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."33 Furthermore,
federal courts-with Rule 501 as their beacon-are bestowed the right and
entrusted "the responsibility to examine the policies behind the federal
common law privileges and to alter or amend them when 'reason and
experience' so demand."34
The common law recognizes two distinct, but related marital
privileges. 11 One is the spousal testimonial privilege, which allows the
witness-spouse to refuse to testify adversely against the other in criminal or
related proceedings .36 The second is the marital communications privilege,
which permits a defendant to refuse to testify and allows a defendant to bar
his or her spouse or former spouse from testifying about any confidential
communications made during their marriage .7
The Privilege has ancient roots. 38 It was borne from the conjunction
of "two canons of medieval jurisprudence" that have since been discredited

provided by the Constitution, federal statutes, or the Supreme Court. Id. The Rule goes on to
specify that in a civil case, "state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state
law supplies the rule of decision." Id.
33 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) (stressing courts' ability to modify
rules of privilege using Rule 501).
34 See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (using Rule 501 to alter
marital communications privilege). The Allery court was presented with a brutal set of facts: the
defendant was appealing his conviction for attempting to rape his 12-year-old daughter. Id. at
1363-64. Most of the evidence used against the defendant involved testimony from his spouse. Id.
The case turned on the marital communications privilege rather than the adverse testimonial
privilege. Id. Although an exception to the marital communications privilege already existed when
one spouse harmed the witness-spouse, the Allery court expanded that exception to include
instances in which children of the marriage were harmed. Id. at 1367; see also Goodno, supra note
3, at 31-32 (arguing for even more expansive interpretation of marital communications privilege).
35 See United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1,9-11 (1stCir. 2014) (outlining marital privileges);
United States v. Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14, 17-19 (1st Cir. 1999) (providing facts of case and history of
both marital privileges); United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing marital
communications privilege); Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366 (invoking Rule 501 to shape marital
communications privilege as required by facts of case); Goodno, supra note 3, at 3-10 (detailing
both privileges); see also United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing
rationales behind marital communications privilege). Like the adverse testimonial privilege, the
primary rationale for the existence of the martial communications privilege is the "public policy
interests in protecting the integrity of marriages and ensuring that spouses freely communicate with
one another." White, 974 F.2d at 1138; United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir.
1978) ("In [the Seventh and Second] Circuits[,] marital communications having to do with the
commission of a crime and not with the privacy of the marriage itself do not fall within the [marital
communications] privilege's protection.").
36 See sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text.
37 See sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-46 (1980) (delving into background of
spousal privileges).
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and abandoned.3 9 The rule in its original form, banning all testimony by a
witness-spouse, survived until a Supreme Court decision in 19 3 3 .40
In Funk v. United States, the Court abolished this complete
testimonial disqualification in the federal courts and allowed a defendant's41
spouse to provide testimony in favor and in support of the defendant.
Importantly, the Court did not modify the aspect of the rule that allowed
"either spouse [to] prevent the other from giving adverse testimony."42 As a
result, "[t]he rule thus evolved into one of privilege rather than one of
absolute disqualification. 4 3
In Pineda-Mateo,the Government, in its brief, discussed the Funk
decision to convey that the historical justifications of an absolute ban on
39 See id. at 44 (expanding on history of Privilege). The first canon from which the rule derives
dictated that "an accused was not permitted to testify on his own behalf because of his interest in
the proceeding." Id. The second canon dictated that husband and wife were one, and that "because
the woman had no recognized separate legal existence," the husband embodied and controlled that
one. Id.
40 See id. (referring to important changes in Funk v. United States); see also Funk v. United
States, 290 U.S. 371, 373, 386-87 (1933) (ruling that wife was competent to testify on her
husband's behalf). In modifying the spousal testimonial privilege to allow beneficial testimony,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the notions that fueled the prohibition were outdated. Funk, 290
U.S. at 386-87. The Court did not agree with the idea that a spouse testifying on behalf of their
partner would somehow endanger "the harmony and confidence of marital relations." Funk, 290
U.S. at 381. Furthermore, the concern that a witness-spouse is likely to commit perjury on behalf
of the defendant-spouse is one properly left to the jury. Funk, 290 U.S. at 376; Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958) (discussing Funk decision, reasoning, and ramifications). Funk
"rejected the phase of the common-law rule which excluded testimony by spouses for each other."
Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76 (emphasis in original). The reason for barring beneficial testimony by the
witness-spouse for the defendant-spouse "had been the practice of disqualifying witnesses with a
personal interest in the outcome of a case." Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76. However, "[w]idespread
disqualifications because of interest ...[have] long since been abolished ... in accordance with
the modern trend" allowing "interested witnesses to testify" and leaving the responsibility of
"assess[ing] their credibility" for the jury. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76.
41 See Funk, 290 U.S. at 380-82 (dismantling historical foundation of complete ban on spousal
testimony); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 ("Indeed, it was not until 1933, in Funk v. United
States, that this Court abolished the testimonial disqualification in the federal courts, so as to permit
the spouse of a defendant to testify in the defendant's behalf.") (citation omitted).
42 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (acknowledging aspect of rule left undisturbed by Funk); Funk,
290 U.S. at 386 ("[Tlhe decision of the court below, in holding the wife incompetent, is
erroneous.").
43 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (explaining decision's role in evolution of Privilege); see also
Bermingham, supra note 1, at 1023-26 (discussing history and modernization of Privilege).

[T]he Supreme Court abolished the portion of the rule excluding testimony by one
spouse in favor of the other, reasoning that the rationale behind it-witness
incompetency because of interest-was outdated and therefore no longer supported the
rule's application. The remainder of the rule was treated as a privilege barring adverse
testimony in the absence of the consent of both spouses.
Bermingham, supra note 1, at 1023.
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spousal testimony were outdated: "the law long had abandoned the principle
that a defendant could not testify in his own defense, and therefore exclusion
of the non-accused spouse's testimony in favor of the defendant was no
longer justified."'
Conversely, Pineda construed the Funk ruling as
conservative, noting that, while the Court tweaked the Privilege to allow
beneficial testimony, it kept intact the ability of either spouse to prevent the
other from offering adverse testimony.4 1 Pineda argued that, although the
Privilege is now vested in the witness-spouse rather than existing as an
absolute ban of spousal testimony, this is merely a minor adjustment that left
the important goal of protecting spouses from being compelled to contribute
to their loved one's prosecution untouched. 41
The Supreme Court then considered the scope of the Privilege in
1958 with Hawkins v. United States.47 In Hawkins, the defendant's wife

volunteered to testify against him and the defendant invoked the Privilege in
an effort to stop her from doing so.48 The Government argued that the court
should draw a distinction between compelling a witness-spouse to testify
adversely and allowing a witness-spouse to do so voluntarily.49 However,
the Court disagreed, finding that "the law should not force or encourage
testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing
domestic differences."5O Referring to the societal interest of upholding the
intimate and private nature of marriages, the Court elected to maintain the
44 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 15 (addressing evolution of Privilege
beginning in

Funk).
45 See Brief of Appellee at 12, United States v. Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2018)
(No.
17-1857) (discussing Court's modification of common law rule since Funk).
46 See id. at 14-16 (explaining how developing Privilege does not diminish
its societal

interests).
47 See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76-79 (1958) (discussing Privilege,
its historical
weight, and courts' reluctance to modify it).
48 See id. at 74-75 (stating facts of case). Petitioner was convicted in federal court for violating
the Mann Act. Id. at 74. Over the petitioner's objection, the district court permitted the
Government to use his wife as a witness against him. Id. at 74-75. Relying on precedent, the Tenth
Circuit held that this permission was not erroneous. Id. at 75. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the "long-standing rule of evidence which bars a husband or wife from
testifying against his or her spouse." Id.
49 See id. at 77 (identifying Government's argument and Court's hesitation to agree).
The
Court noted that the Government did not suggest that "authority, reason or experience" require that
the "old rule" prohibiting adverse spousal testimony be wholly rejected. Id. Instead, the
Government asked only for a modification of the existing rule. Id. The Government sought to
establish that either spouse be permitted to testify voluntarily, even if said testimony would be
adverse to the defendant-spouse's case. Id. However, the Court rejected this argument and declined
to expand the Privilege accordingly, insisting instead that it is against public policy interests to pit
spouses against one another. Id. at 78-79. Nonetheless, the Court also recognized that expansions
and modifications to the Privilege are sometimes necessary to further the interests of the public and
that such changes have occurred in the past. Id. at 76.
50 See id. at 78-79 (explaining Court's reason for rejecting Government's argument).
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"rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the other unless both
consent."'" Importantly, the Court mentioned in its conclusion that "this
decision does not foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be
dictated by 'reason and experience. "'52
In his brief, Pineda stressed the rigidity of the Privilege that was
applied in Hawkins and the consequences of relaxing its requirements."
Quoting Hawkins, Pineda noted that "[a]dverse testimony given in criminal
4
any marriage. 5
proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost
Conversely, the Government noted that the Hawkins Court never mentioned
55
Further, the
the Exception and thus never expressly forbade it.
that retained
one
as
decision
Government's brief characterized the Hawkins
exception
an
a broad construction of the Privilege and briefly discussed
5 6 The Government noted that the
known as the "injured spouse exception.
51 See id. at 78 (discussing interests preserved by spousal testimonial privilege). The Court
noted that the absolute ban of one spouse testifying on behalf of the other had been eradicated and
"undermined" by "time and changing legal practices." Id. at 77. Further, the Court added that such
influences had not undermined the barring of adverse testimony between spouses and that the
"policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for [the family in question], but for the
benefit ... of the public as well." Id.
52 See Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 79 (mentioning explicitly that Privilege should change and develop
as needed). In this passage, the Hawkins Court quoted the language of Rule 501 to emphasize its
intent to allow federal courts to make decisions regarding privileges. Id. In doing so, the courts
may establish and amend such decisions after considering the facts of each case and the modem
circumstances surrounding-and implicated by-the privileges. Id.
53 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at 12-13 (stressing importance of interests protected
by Privilege).
54 See id. (arguing that changes, especially one offered by Government, are best left to
Congress) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 16 (arguing Privilege should apply despite
unfavorable precedent). "The government [in Hawkins] did not ask the Court to discard the
privilege entirely but rather to hold that the privilege is controlled by the non-defendant spouse so
that a non-defendant spouse could testify voluntarily, even when it was against the defendantspouse's wishes." Id. "The Hawkins Court rejected the government's request" and "concluded
that the modern rationale for the privilege was its necessity in fostering 'family peace."' Id.
(quoting Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77).
56 See id. at 16-17 (discussing issue presented before Hawkins Court). The Government
quoted the Court in its brief, mentioning that Hawkins relied heavily on the interest of fostering
"family peace." Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
While the Hawkins Court retained a broad construction of the [Privilege], just two years
later, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to [it]. The Wyatt Court held that the
[G]overnment could compel an unwilling wife to testify against her husband for an
offense that he committed against her. The Court held that an exception for spouse-onspouse crime was necessary because of the need for evidence from the victim spouse in
such cases. The spouse-on-spouse crime exception includes not only violent crimes but
also crimes committed by one spouse against the property of the other. In addition, lower
courts have expanded this exception to cover crimes committed by one spouse against
children, and have applied it to both marital privileges.
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Hawkins Court ultimately held that the defendant-spouse shall continue to
be permitted to invoke the Privilege and prevent a willing witness-spouse to
testify."
The Supreme Court revisited the Privilege and its scope in 1980 in
Trammel v United States." The defendant sought to suppress the voluntary
testimony of his wife, an unindicted but alleged co-conspirator who agreed
to testify against her husband in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 9
The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant's wife was permitted to testify
against her husband, declaring an exception to the Privilege when the
"defendant [spouse] ...has jointly participated in a criminal conspiracy with
[the witness spouse]."' However, the Supreme Court-instead of adopting
the Exception in its entirety -acknowledged that "[t]he ancient foundations
for so sweeping a [spousal testimonial] privilege have long since
disappeared," but held that "the existing rule should be modified so that the
witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely."61
Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
57 See id. at 16 (citing Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77) (defending Privilege for upholding "family
peace").
58 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1980) (reviewing Privilege and its
challenges). The defendant was indicted for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand
and the Philippines. Id. at 42. The defendant's wife was named as a co-conspirator because
authorities discovered heroin in her belongings during a routine customs search in Hawaii. Id.
During her testimony, "[s]he explained that her cooperation with the Government was based on
assurances that she would be given lenient treatment." Id. at 42-43. "She then described, in
considerable detail, her role and that of her husband in the heroin distribution conspiracy." Id. at
43.
59 See id. at 42-43 (reviewing procedural history).
60 See United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978) (using precedent
established in Hawkins to respond to defendant's argument). The Tenth Circuit noted that
"[n]othing in Hawkins or any other reported decision, to [its] knowledge, prohibits the voluntary
testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity from
the Government in return for her testimony." Id. at 1168. Furthermore, if it were the court's
mission to uphold the sanctity of marriage and protect familial values, then it would be vital to
punish "those who have committed grievous criminal acts which most assuredly have led to the
breakdown and destruction of many family units and marital relations involving illicit trafficking
and use of dangerous drugs and narcotics." Id. at 1171.
61 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52-53 (accepting narrower version of Exception). The Supreme
Court modified the Privilege by allowing the witness-spouse to decide whether to testify adversely.
Id. The Court reached this result by balancing the interests protected by the Privilege against the
broader societal interest of investigating and prosecuting those who commit criminal acts. Id. at
50-51.
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that
"the public ...has a right to every man's evidence." As such, they must be strictly
construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify
or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."
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Accordingly, "the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed
from testifying."62

In his brief, Pineda relied heavily on the Trammel decision because
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to adopt the Exception and declined
to do SO. 63 In contrast, the Government noted that the Court never mentioned
the Exception specifically, concluding instead that the Privilege rests only
not
with the non-defendant spouse and, therefore, a defendant-spouse could
64
invoke the Privilege to bar a willing witness-spouse from testifying.
Three federal circuits-the Second, Third, and Ninth-have likewise
declined to recognize the Exception. 6 However, the Seventh Circuit ruled
Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
62 See id. at 53 (rejecting Hawkins and suggesting modification of Privilege). In its explanation
of the Privilege and its final decision to modify it, the Court noted that the Privilege has faced
immense criticism. Id. at 44-45. The Court quoted legal scholar and professor, John Henry
Wigmore: "[the Privilege is] the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction
to truth in practice." Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Committee on
Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the American Bar Association called for [the Privilege's]
abolition. In its place, Wigmore and others suggested a privilege protecting only private marital
communications, modeled on the privilege between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and
physician and patient." Id. (citations omitted).
63 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 45, at 14 (pointing to Court's decision in Trammel).
Pineda argued that, because only the Seventh Circuit adopted the Exception since the Court's
decision in Trammel, it was indicative of an overall consensus among the remaining circuits that
the Exception is too broad or that reason and experience do not yet demand it. Id. at 5. Further,
Pineda contended that "[t]he interests the spousal testimonial privilege serves, preserving marital
harmony and preventing the impropriety of requiring one spouse to condemn his or her partner to
conviction and likely incarceration, have not weakened since the Supreme Court considered the
privilege in Trammel." Id. at 7. Because these interests have not abated, it was argued the Privilege
that protects them should not be modified. See id.
64 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 7-8 (reiterating that Court did not forbid an
exception to Privilege). In its brief, the Government argued against the idea that the Exception was
rejected. Id. at 10. The Government emphasized the fact that the Court never mentioned the joint
participation exception to the Privilege. Id. at 10-11. Further, the Government continued, the job
of the Supreme Court is to "decide important questions of federal law, not to resolve cases on the
narrowest grounds possible." Id. at 11. "The Supreme Court's election not to base its decision on
an available, narrower ground tells us nothing other than the Court understood that its primary role
is to decide important questions of federal law like the continued viability of a prior Supreme Court
precedent." Id. at 12.
65 See United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1042 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
incorporate Exception into Ninth Circuit jurisprudence). The witness-spouse assisted her husband,
the defendant, with his heroin-trafficking business by answering calls, translating, and relaying
instructions. Id. at 1032-33. The court, relying on Trammel, ruled that the Government
"improperly compelled" the witness-spouse's testimony against her husband. Id. at 1042; see also
In re Malfitano, 755 F.2d 1022, 1026-28 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to incorporate exception into
Second Circuit jurisprudence). This court also found Trammel persuasive when rejecting the
Exception. Malfitano, 755 F.2d at 1026; In re Grand Jury Empanelled October 18, 1979 Witness,
633 F.2d 276, 278-80 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusing to incorporate Exception into Third Circuit
jurisprudence). The appellant challenged an order holding her in contempt for refusing to testify
against her husband. GrandJury, 633 F.2d at 276. The court denied the Government's argument
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in United States v. Van Drunen that it would adopt the Exception.66 In that
case, the court stated that by adopting the Exception, it limited the Privilege
"to those cases where it makes most sense, namely, where a spouse who is
neither a victim nor a participant observes evidence of the other spouse's
crime."67 The court specified two main reasons for adopting the Exception:

The first was that the goal intended to be served by the
[P]rivilege, i.e. preventing either spouse from committing
the "unforgivable act" of testifying against the other in a
criminal case, did not justify assuring a criminal that he or
she could enlist the aid of a spouse in a criminal enterprise
without fear that by recruiting an accomplice the criminal
was creating another potential witness. The second reason
was that the rehabilitative effect of a marriage, which in part
justifies the [P]rivilege, is diminished when both spouses are
participants in the crime.68

that a marriage between two criminals engaged in a conspiracy together is not worth salvaging
because that marriage will probably dissolve anyway. GrandJury, 633 F.2d at 277-78.
66 See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir. 1974) (recognizing
Exception). In Van Drunen, the Government wanted to compel the co-conspirator witness-spouse
to testify and asked the court to adopt the Exception. Id. at 1395-96. The Court of Appeals
permitted the testimony and declared: "we think [the] goal [of preserving familial interests] does
not justify assuring a criminal that he can enlist the aid of his spouse in a criminal enterprise without
fear that by recruiting an accomplice or coconspirator he is creating another potential witness." Id.
at 1396. Therefore, the court acknowledged the need for the Exception by weighing the interest of
protecting marital harmony against the interest of prosecuting spouses involved in crimes as coconspirators. See id. The court explained that its holding limited the Privilege to those cases where
the witness-spouse is neither a conspirator nor a victim. See id. at 1397. In such circumstances,
the Privilege upholds the important interest of preserving the sanctity of marriage, contributes to
the rehabilitation of the defendant-spouse, and simultaneously ensures that the Privilege itself sides
with the interests of justice and truth. See id. The court acknowledged that Hawkins touched on
the idea of an exception, but explained that it is not precedential in this area:
We do not view Hawkins as controlling. Sub silentio holdings "obviously ... are not
of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question
on the merits." Hawkins must be accorded even less precedential value on the question
whether there is a coconspirator exception to the privilege against spousal testimony,
because the facts are so uncertain that it is not clear there was even a sub silentio holding.
Id. (citations omitted).
67 See id. at 1397 (justifying adoption of Exception and providing circumstances to which it
applies).
68 See United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Van Drunen, 501 F.2d
at 1396-97) (stressing important interest of prosecuting all parties). The "rehabilitative effect" of
the Privilege may be expressed as follows: "the [P]rivilege encourages the preservation of a
marriage which may conceivably be an important institution contributing to the rehabilitation of
the defendant spouse." Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1397.
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The First Circuit's decision in Pineda-Mateoaligned with both the
historical weight of the Privilege and the traditional interests of marriage that
the Privilege was enacted to protect. 69 The court made clear the
Government's argument: that the evidentiary needs of compelling a jointparticipant spouse to offer adverse testimony outweigh the policy rationales
behind the Privilege.7° The evidentiary needs stem from two main ideas: (1)
that a conspiracy, which amounts to a collective criminal agreement,
presents a unique and potentially devastating threat to the public;71 and (2)
that conspiracies are often inchoate and secretive processes. 72 In addressing
the first idea, the Government argued that failure to allow it to efficiently
build its case against conspirators wrongly placed the law on the side of
In addressing the second idea, the
conspiracies within marriages .7
Government emphasized that it often needs to obtain testimony of coHowever, the
conspirators in order to subvert the conspiracy. 74
to
Government
the
allowing
by
that
is,
notion
counterargument to that

69 See United States v. Pineda-Mateo, 905 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2018) (outlining history of
Privilege and stressing interests it preserves). The first strike against the prospect of adopting the
Exception, the court declared, is that it does not have nearly as extensive a history in federal
jurisprudence as the Privilege itself does. Id. at 16.
70 See id. at 22 (outlining Government's position).
71 See id. (discussing specifics of Government's position). The Government argues that a
"[c]ollective criminal agreement ... presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual
derelicts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 See id. (explaining Government's reasoning in argument in favor of Exception); Brief of
Appellant, supranote 15, at 9 (discussing rationales of criminalizing conspiracy and its intricacies).
"One of the primary rationales for criminalizing conspiracy separately from the underlying offense
is that the conspirators will obtain comfort and support from each other, making it more probable
that they will commit additional and more complex crimes in the future." Brief of Appellant, supra
note 15, at 9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (imposing criminal liability whenever "two or more
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States ... in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy.").
73 See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 22 (citing Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 28) (stating
Government's asserted need for evidence due to threat and harm caused by conspiracy).
Not allowing the Government to abrogate the privilege in this context "wrongly places
the law on the side of protecting conspiracies within a marriage," and therefore the
Government "has a particularly strong need for evidence so that it can dismantle the
conspiracy before it inflicts additional harms on the public."
Id.
74 See id. (continuing discussion of Government's argument). Here, the Government pointed
to the hearsay exception for statements of a co-conspirator to show how the courts have understood
conspiracies to be complex and secretive. Id. Therefore, the Government the importance of
testimony in their unraveling. See id.
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compel co-conspirators to testify against their defendant-spouse, it presents
a unique danger due to the broad application of the concept of conspiracy.7
In response to the Government's argument, the Court relied on its
historical recognition of the Privilege alone, without invoking the
Exception. 76 Furthermore, the evidentiary interests that the Government
proffered, according to the Court, were "less hefty" than the interests that the
Privilege is designed to serve, namely those of marital and familial
harmony .7 Finally, the court rested its conclusion on the Supreme Court's
decision in Trammel, stating that the Court was "provided the opportunity to
address" this Exception, yet "chose to vest the [P]rivilege only in the
testifying spouse instead of opting for the narrower remedy of recognizing a
78
joint participant exception.
In arguing its case, the Government failed to persuasively use the
Supreme Court's rulings in Funk and Van Drunen and the Tenth Circuit's
ruling in Trammel.79 Instead, the Government stressed the crucial
evidentiary interests that exist when investigating and prosecuting
75 See Bermingham, supra note 1, at 1032 n.88 (outlining concern of prosecutorial abuse in
situations where Exception applies).

Although in order to convict an individual of conspiracy the prosecution must prove
there was an agreement to carry out an unlawful purpose, the existence of the agreement
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. As to the requirement that one of the
agreeing persons must have committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, proof of
a noncriminal and relatively insignificant act will suffice. The law has repeatedly been
criticized as overbroad.
Id. (citations omitted).
76

See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 22 (discrediting Government's argument). The court found

it damaging that the Government did not address the "'experience' side" of Rule 501's equation.
Id. "This Court has recognized the spousal testimonial privilege without the joint-participant
exception for many years, and yet the Government never present[ed] an argument as to how our
experience with the spousal testimonial privilege shows that we should now recognize this
exception when we did not in the past." Id.
77 See id. at 23-24 (refuting Government's argument). The court listed several reasons as to
why it was not persuaded by the Government's argument: (1) the Government's logic would
outweigh other evidentiary privileges, such as the Fifth Amendment; (2) there are many types of
evidence the Government can obtain without "piercing" the Privilege; and (3) the court will not
decide which marriages are worthy of protection and which are not. See id.
78 See id. at 24 (reasoning Supreme Court could have adopted Exception in Trammel). The
court stated that the Trammel holding was "not conclusive that no joint participation exception
should be recognized." Id.
79 See id. (rebutting Government's use of Van Drunen). "We also decline the Government's
invitation to follow the Seventh Circuit's lead because we do not find persuasive the two rationales
on which the Seventh Circuit's view is based." Id.; Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 17-19, 52
(discussing Van Drunen Court's reasoning). In Van Drunen, the Seventh Circuit allowed the
Government to compel the witness-spouse's testimony based on its ruling that preserving familial
interests is outweighed by disallowing a criminal to recruit an accomplice without fear of creating
another witness. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir. 1974).

374

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXV

conspiracies, and how the Privilege complicates such prosecutions.80 The
court did not find these interests compelling enough to outweigh the interest
The Government could have
of preserving marital harmony.81
simultaneously stressed the need for testimonial evidence in conspiracy
cases while also using the Seventh and Second Circuits' decisions to explain
that the public's interest in punishing and deterring criminal activity
outweighs, and in fact supports, the public interest of marital harmony and
protecting families .82 The Government should have presented its case to the
First Circuit as an opportunity to adapt and develop the Privilege to more
closely meet and satisfy modem day societal interests, as had been done in
prior Supreme Court cases .83

The Government should have used the Funk decision to symbolize
both the ability and the duty that the federal courts have to modify the
Privilege so that it adheres to modem public policy.84 Specifically, the

80 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 27-28 (noting pitfalls presented by Privilege).
First, the Government highlighted the "unique danger" that conspiracies pose: "[t]he privilege,
when invoked where the conspiracy involves spouses, helps foster the continued existence of
dangerous criminal confederations under the guise of a marriage." Id. at 27. Then, the Government
reiterated the "inchoate nature" of offenses involving conspiracies, which makes them difficult to
investigate: "[c]onspiracies are 'characterized by secrecy, rendering [them] difficult of detection
[and] requiring more time for [their] discovery .... " Id. at 29 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915)).
81 See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 24 (explaining briefly rejection of Government's argument).
82 See id. (rejecting Government's argument); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
52-53 (1980) (outlining Court's reasons for modifying Privilege, noting "contemporary
justification for affording an accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive."); United States v.
Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing government interests). Before
Trammel went before the Supreme Court, the Government persuaded the Tenth Circuit that
compelling the defendant's spouse, an unindicted co-conspirator, to provide adverse testimony was
more conducive to the interests upheld by the Privilege, particularly when the marriage in question
was between co-conspirators who distributed heroin. Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1171. "The illicit
heroin importation activities pursued by the parties would have effectively denied the establishment
of 'family peace' which could in anywise have been alienated by [the witness spouse's] testimony."
Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1171. In order to uphold the sanctity of marriage and protect familial values,
it is vital to punish those who "have committed grievous criminal acts which most assuredly have
led to the breakdown and destruction of many family units and marital relations involving illicit
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and narcotics." Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1171.
83 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52-53. (failing to persuade Supreme Court to develop Privilege
to protect modern societal interests). In reaching its conclusion in Trammel, the Supreme Court
focused on Rule 501's flexibility and the necessity of adapting federal privileges in order to meet
the societal interests of the time. Id. "Our consideration of the foundations for the privilege and
its history satisfy us that 'reason and experience' no longer justify so sweeping a rule as that found
acceptable by the Court in Hawkins." Id. at 53.
84 See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (stating public policy rationale
surrounding spousal testimony has changed with modern legislation). The Court recognized
evolving public policy when it stated that "[t]he public policy of one generation, under changed
conditions, may not.., be the public policy of another." See id.
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Government could have illustrated how the Supreme Court in Funk was
willing to expand the Privilege by permitting the supportive testimony of one
spouse for their defendant-spouse-a stark contrast from the absolute ban
that the Privilege demanded previously .8
Furthermore, the First Circuit focused much of its analysis on Rule
501 and the "'reason and experience"' prongs of Rule 501's privilege
standard. 6 However, the Supreme Court in both Hawkins and Trammel,
while never addressing the Exception itself, expressly left the "door open"
to allow future courts the opportunity to update the Privilege as they see fit. 7
Armed with the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the Privilege will
continue to evolve, as well as the broad discretion and language of Rule 501,
the Government in Pineda-Mateowould have benefited from addressing an
ever-evolving society and its current view on marriage.88 The Trammel
Court expressly stated the idea that privileges should evolve with the times .89
Had the Government presented such an argument, it would have forced the
First Circuit to address declining marriage rates and increasing divorce rates
in the United States and consider what these numbers indicate about the
public's perception of marriage and its interests -particularly in context of

The conclusion which the court reached was based not upon any definite act of
legislation, but upon the trend of congressional opinion and of legislation (that is to say
of legislation generally), and upon the great weight of judicial authority which, since the
earlier decisions, had developed in support of a more modern rule. In both cases the court
necessarily proceeded upon the theory that the resultant modification which these
important considerations had wrought in the rules of the old common law was within the
power of the courts to declare and make operative.
Id. at 380; Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 15 (mentioning Funk only briefly).
85 See Funk, 290 U.S. at 386 (holding wife was in fact competent to testify).
86 See Pineda-Mateo,905 F.3d at 24 (weighing heavily on Privilege's extensive history).
87 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (using Rule 501 to weigh Government's need for evidence
against public policy); see also FED. R. EVID. 501 (allowing federal courts to use reason and
experience to determine whether Privilege applies); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79
(1958) ("[T]his decision does not foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated
by 'reason and experience."').
88 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (stating history of Privilege and its impact when applied).
"That the privilege is one affecting marriage, home, and family relationships- already subject to
much erosion in our day-also counsels caution." Id. at 48. The Trammel Court acknowledged
the idea that perhaps society's perception of the institution of marriage has changed over time. See
id.
89 See id. at 52 (explaining evolving perception of marriage). The Court recognized the
evolution of gender roles and women's rights in a marriage: "[c]hip by chip, over the years those
archaic notions have been cast aside so that '[no] longer is the female destined solely for the home
and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."' Id.
(quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).
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the Privilege and in conjunction with the interest of prosecuting conspirators
who threaten the safety of the public. 9°
A more complete argument in support of the First Circuit's adoption
of the Exception would address the concern of abuse due to the broad
application of conspiracy; this concern should have been starkly contrasted
91
against the dangers of conspiracies and the difficulty of prosecuting them.
Additionally, the Government must address both concerns protected by the
Privilege: (1) preserving the sanctity of marriage, which is addressed
and wife
thoroughly; and (2) avoiding the unseemliness of pitting husband
92
against each other, which is often overlooked in the argument.
Given the precedential weight persuading the First Circuit to reject
the Exception, it is not surprising that the Privilege remains intact. However,
Rule 501 bestows upon the Federal Courts the discretion and responsibility

90 See Garrison, supra note 30, at 283-84 (discussing modem rates of marriage among young
people).
An important reason why marriage is controversial is that it is in decline. All across the
industrialized world, young adults are marrying later and increasing numbers may not
marry at all. Those who do marry face a relatively high probability that their relationships
will terminate in divorce. As a result of these convergent trends, today's adults spend,
on average, a smaller proportion of their adult lives within a marital household than did
their ancestors.
Id.; see also Rasul, supra note 30, at 1-2, 19,22 (analyzing modem marriage rates and economic
interests contributing to their decline).
91 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446-49 (1949) (stressing just how broad
concept of conspiracy can be).
The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition. Despite
certain elementary and essential elements, it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special
coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid. It
is always "predominantly mental in composition" because it consists primarily of a
meeting of minds and an intent.
... It is not intended to question that the basic conspiracy principle has some place in
modem criminal law, because to unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength,
opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more difficult to
police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.
Id.
92 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 n.12 (justifying modification of Privilege with maintaining
protection of societal interests).
It is argued that abolishing the privilege will permit the Government to come between
husband and wife, pitting one against the other. That, too, misses the mark.
Neither Hawkins, nor any other privilege, prevents the Government from enlisting one
spouse to give information concerning the other or to aid in the other's apprehension. It
is only the spouse's testimony in the courtroom that is prohibited.
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to establish and adapt the rules of evidence. In consideration of modem
societal interests, there seems to be a push for adoption of the Exception.
Upon adoption, the Government would have the concerning ability to
compel a witness-spouse to testify adversely against their defendant-spouse
in a criminal proceeding. In doing so, the sanctity and privacy of marriage
would be compromised. However, it would be compromised in the name of
truth, justice, and the goal of protecting families from those who would seek
to endanger the public by breaking the laws by which the rest of society has
agreed to live.
Dean Fiotto

